Pivotal Decision Maker, Agenda Power and Collective Responsibility Attribution

The replication of the Bartling et al (2014) experiment reported here explores the role that agenda power plays when the decision making context incorporates sequential voting. In our replication of the \citet{Bartlingetal2014} experiment we confirm their finding that pivotality is the basis for responsibility attribution for the individual decision makers voting sequentially on an allocation to recipients. It is also the case though that agenda power plays an important role in responsibility attribution in contexts in which the decision makes vote sequentially on an allocation to recipients. We modified the Bartling et al (2014) experiment by incorporating a proposal stage in which one of the DMs decides which two of three possible allocations are put to the sequential vote. The recipients in the modified experiments do in fact punish proposing DMs disproportionately when the allocations proposed are less fair to the recipients. This agenda power heuristic along with pivotality appear to shape responsibility attribution for collective decisions.
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